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As antitrust specialists would expect, Robert Bork's book The
Antitrust Paradox' is an important contribution to the antitrust
dialogue. It draws on his scholarly contributions to antitrust law and
economics over the past decade and extends his approach to the
study of antitrust issues to new areas. As with Bork's earlier work,
this book will doubtlessly generate controversy.
The book is organized in three parts. Part One is theoretical,
setting out the legislative background and the basic consumer welfare model. Part Two, which deals with applications, is the core of
the book. Bork successively applies the consumer welfare model and
related economic reasoning to mergers (horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate), vertical market restrictions (including price fixing,
exclusive dealing, and territorial restraints), and predatory behavior
(including the setting of prices, distribution practices, and litigation). Part Three is a summation in which Bork offers views on how
the law ought to be enforced and remarks on incentives that encourage enforcement agencies to extend, or attempt to extend, the reach
of the law in ways that, viewed with detachment, are often unwarranted. Along the way, Bork discusses and criticizes other approaches to the study of antitrust, paying particular attention to the
barriers-to-entry approach.
In addition to the book's formal structure, Bork's analyis operates on various conceptual levels, and three types of issues can be
distinguished: the statement of the goals of antitrust, the way in
which antitrust problems are formulated, and the analysis of the
details of specific problems.2 Bork's position on the first of these
issues is that while there are many worthy social goals, there are also
many public policy instruments. Goal achievement is commonly
promoted by matching instruments to goals in a discriminating
t Charles and William L. Day Professor of Economics and Social Science, The University of Pennsylvania.
' R. BORN, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLuc AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) [hereinafter
cited without cross-reference as BoRK].
2 It is easy and often good fun to quibble with details. Given Bork's argumentative style,
it is difficult to suppress this temptation with respect to the book under review. My intent,
however, is to forgo this and focus on the central issues..
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way. Bork insists that efficiency is not only an important social goal,
but that it is the only goal antitrust is well-suited to promote. 3 To
burden antitrust with other goals confuses the enforcement process
and is counterproductive; the protection of competitors rather than
competition easily results.'
It is easy to agree that antitrust ought not dissipate its energies
in the pursuit of other social goals to which it is only obscurely
connected, especially if this impairs the quality of its enforcement
relative to the goal of efficiency. But this does not imply that other
social goals should be suppressed altogether.5 Bork omits the possibility that, although across-the-board attention to other social goals
is unwarranted, specific exceptions to this general policy should be
admitted. Thus, if other social goals operate intensively in particular circumstances, and if these can be clearly distinguished and
easily recognized, antitrust might be used to promote these goals in
a discriminating manner.
It is important, however, that these other goals be described
with care and the circumstances in which they are held to apply be
limited. Too often, other goals are vaguely stated and invoked uncritically, with the result that such goals are not meaningfully promoted by proposals that purport to have beneficial effects of a nonefficiency kind. Protectionism, which is not a valued social outcome, often results. Furthermore, no one claims that efficiency is
unimportant. Plainly, then, if efficiency is valued and if efficiency
sacrifices are implied by taking one course of action rather than
another, failure to recognize and assess efficiency ramifications is
undesirable. Bork's analysis thus remains applicable whether nonefficiency goals are assigned a zero weight or if, Bork's arguments to
the contrary notwithstanding, nonefficiency values are admitted
and tradeoffs-between, say, dispersed economic power and efficiency-are contemplated.
It is Bork's second level of analysis-formulation of antitrust
problems-that is the core of his book. Bork's contributions to antitrust law and economics, in the book under review and elsewhere,
rely heavily on standard price theory, feature careful reasoning in
which the analysis is run to completion, and tend to neglect strategic factors. He takes the position, which I believe to be correct,
that antitrust must be more informed by economic analysis if the
past mistakes of antitrust enforcement-as illustrated, for example,
79, 81.
'Id. at 81-88.
'BORK

'See, e.g., L.

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

10-13 (1977).
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by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 6 and recently rectified
by Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.7-are to be avoided.
Although Bork's use of static economic analysis might be disputed,
this is not because his economic reasoning is of a fragmentary kind.
To the contrary, having once formulated the analysis in static economic terms, he relentlessly presses the argument to completion.
His treatment of predatory pricing is illustrative, where his systematic application of the static model discloses that pricing efforts to
destroy rivals lack rationality." This is a very strong result.
I would caution, however, that static analysis is appropriate
only if strategic considerations can be presumed to be absentwhere by "strategic" I refer to efforts by established firms to take
up or maintain advance positions (for example, through "strategic"
investment) or to respond contingently to rivalry in ways designed
to discipline existing rivals and/or discourage potential competition
(which is the more general formulation of the predatory pricing
issue). Inasmuch as special structural preconditions, of an incipient
or actual dominant firm kind, usually need to be satisfied before
firms have an incentive to behave strategically, Bork's nonstrategic
approach applies without qualification to most business behavior.
It discloses that, except as these structural preconditions are satisfied, reckless claims of "unfair business practices"-predatory behavior, vertical restraints, other exclusionary activities-are typically protectionist. 9 This is a significant achievement.
Although Bork recognizes that the static model captures only
a fraction of reality and that an appreciation for competition as a
process is often essential,10 he nevertheless eschews dealing with
strategic issues in strategic terms. Where actual or prospective dominance exists, however, antitrust is poorly served by exclusive reliance on static price theory. Rather, allowance needs to be made in
these circumstances for intertemporal incentives and effects."
"Evolutionary process analysis" is frequently illuminating and
sometimes essential when dominant firm conditions come under
scrutiny as well.' 2
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
a BORK 144-54.
1 Id. at 145-59, 291-98, 299-309.
,0 Id. at 92.
" These issues are discussed in Williamson, Williamson on PredatoryPricingII, 88
L.J. 1183 (1979).
6
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Nelson & Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting Competition Under Schump-

terian Competition, 9 BELL J. ECON. 524 (1978).
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The arguments against Bork's antitrust model are not limited
to the static/strategic distinction. Other objections are that Bork
gives insufficient attention to "second best" considerations and that
he defines entry barriers out of existence. Although there is something to be said for both of these objections, they are not as weighty
as many critics believe; with qualifications, Bork's main argument
survives both of them.
To claim, as some do, 3 that the second best literature 4 demonstrates that Bork's partial equilibrium analysis is worthless is to
misread seriously the real ramifications of this literature. Admittedly, the strict preconditions of the simple partial equilibrium
model are never satisfied. But as Bork points out,' 5 this is merely
an existence argument; quantitative substantiality is not implied.
The message, rather, is that where interaction effects with other
sectors in which distortions exist are known to be strong, the simple
partial equilibrium framework ought to be extended to make express provision for such interactions. Neither the efficiency criterion
nor the partial equilibrium orientation is placed in jeopardy on this
account.
Bork's treatment of what are conventionally termed entry barriers' 6 is somewhat more problematic. Bork emphasizes that merit
outcomes, not structure per se, are what matter: 7 the distinction
between remediable and irremediable entry impediments is important in this regard. Little useful public policy purpose is served, and
a considerable risk of public policy mischief results, when conditions
of an irremediable kind are brought under fire. Mistaken treatment
of economies of scale illustrate what is at stake. Thus, suppose that
economies of scale exist and that the market is of sufficient size to
support the larger of two technologies. Since superior outcomes will
be attributable to the less efficient technology only under very unusual conditions, 8 net social benefits ought presumably to be attrib13See, e.g., Sullivan, Book Review, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1214, 1219-21 (1975).
" See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rav. EcON.
STUD. 11 (1956).
"

BoRK 113-14.

"

In Chapter Sixteen Bork discusses several "claimed entry barriers[:] physical product

differentiation, advertising and promotion, capital requirements, and vertical arrangements
such as dealerships, leases, and deferred rebates." Id. at 311.
1 The question for antitrust is whether there exist artificial entry barriers. These
must be barriers that are not forms of superior efficiency and which yet prevent the
forces of the market-entry or the growth of smaller firms already within the industry-from operating to erode market positions not based on efficiency.

Id.
Is Bork discusses the tradeoffs between efficiency and market power in Chapters Five and
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uted to these scale economy conditions. To describe such economies
as "barriers to entry," however, does not invite this conclusion; to
the contrary, mistaken welfare judgments are encouraged. Many of
the enthusiasts of entry-barrier analysis have been reluctant to concede such hazards.
But to demonstrate that conventional entry-barrier arguments
sweep too broadly does not establish that this entire tradition
should be rejected. The possibilities that remediable impediments
to entry might arise and that such circumstances are identifiable
ought to be considered. Consistent with his neglect of strategic factors, Bork seems unwilling to entertain such possibilities. This unwillingness is due chiefly to his implicit assumption that labor and
capital markets operate frictionlessly, so that every market outcome
is presumptively a merit outcome 9 and further discussion is pointless. Once transaction costs are admitted, however, the assumption
of frictionlessness no longer applies, the possibility of introducing
strategic impediments to entry arises, and the main argument needs
to be qualified. To be sure, the exceptions may not be numerous and
the difficulties of informed or efficacious intervention may be great.
Such "defects" might be better tolerated, therefore, rather than
made subject to public policy review and attempted rectification.
But this is a separate argument. Neither Bork nor others of the antientry barrier persuasion have addressed the entry barrier issues on
these grounds. Since the frictionlessness assumptions on which Bork
implicitly relies are unacceptable to many students of antitrust,
continuing dispute over the nature and importance of entry barriers
is to be expected.
On the whole, Bork's use of economic reasoning is compelling;
he makes a convincing case that economic analysis should play a
more central role in antitrust policy formation and enforcement.
The core issues with which antitrust must come to terms are the
ones that Bork addresses in this book, and his tendency to define
antitrust issues narrowly ensures that the dialogue will continue.
Whether efficiency is the only legitimate antitrust goal is certain to
be disputed by many thoughtful students of antitrust, and even
within an efficiency framework, static economic analysis must
sometimes give way to intertemporal and process analysis if dominant firm issues are to be addressed in relevant terms. Faced with
issues such as these, antitrust can look forward to a lively future,
" This assumes that consumers are not egregiously manipulated by selling efforts. Although there are exceptions, for most products this is a reasonable assumption.

1979]

Review

531

in which Professor Bork and this book will doubtlessly play influential parts. The Antitrust Paradox is essential reading for antitrust
scholars and practitioners- alike.

